China’s Aid and Trade Diplomacy: A Zero-Sum Game?
China’s active economic diplomacy has revived debates on new mercantilism as a form of government intervention in shaping a globalized world. In this paper, I investigate one of the main grievances against these policies: their ability to divert existing trade relationships, thus creating a zero-sum competition environment. Using data on development aid, official loans, trade and investment deals, and focusing on Africa, I quantify the trade creation and diversion effects of China’s economic diplomacy tools. I find that official finance, and chiefly development aid, positively affects exports to China and third-party countries, especially in the manufacturing sector. A similar effect is observed with trade agreements. Of the considered tools, none displays strong diversion effects. When it comes to international trade, China’s aid and trade diplomacy is not a zero-sum game.
Recommended citation: Ait Benasser, Youssef. (2022). "China’s Aid and Trade Diplomacy: A Zero-Sum Game?".